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I. INTRODUCTION: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC
Since the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS") was
first identified in 1981,1 this disease has had far-reaching social and
economic consequences across the country. One of the most profound
effects of the AIDS epidemic can be seen in the public health care
system. While infection control measures have long been in place to
reduce transmission of the disease in the health care setting, in the
years following the initial discovery of AIDS, health care workers
("HCWs") were particularly concerned about the possibility of
contracting the lethal disease from their patients. Furthermore,
although the risk of transmission of the human immunodeficiency
virus ("HIV")-the retrovirus that causes AIDS 2-from a patient to a
HCW proved exceptionally low, 3 HCWs questioned how those workers
who had contracted the disease in a health care setting would be
compensated for their injuries. Over time, HIV has come to be
recognized as an occupational disease under workers' compensation
statutes when contracted in the health care setting.4 However, it
remains difficult for infected workers to prove that their contraction of
the disease resulted from the performance of their jobs. Moreover,
even when these employees do successfully prove causation, workers'
compensation coverage has generally proved to be inadequate. 5
In addition to the problems encountered when HIV is
contracted by those employees within the health care system, the
dilemma of providing benefits to workers with occupationally
transmitted HIV seems to be reemerging in new employment settings.
Questions have now surfaced as to whether the scope of workers'
compensation laws should be extended to employees outside the
health care field who have contracted HIV in the workplace. A
Connecticut court recently held in Doe v. Department of Corrections
that a corrections officer who contracted the disease as a result of his
work with a prison's emergency response unit was entitled to workers'
1. Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency
Recommendations, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 101 (Mar. 4, 1983).
2. See GERALD J. STINE, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 35 (1993).
The terms are generally used interchangeably throughout this Note.
3. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT,
14 CASES OF HIV INFECTION AND AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hasr1402.htm.
4. Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the
Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 12 (1989).
5. Patti M. Tereskerz & Janine Jagger, Occupationally Acquired HIV The Vulnerability of
Health Care Workers under Workers' Compensation Laws, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1558, 1559-60
(1997).
[Vol. 59:3:937
HIVAS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
compensation benefits. 6 The court reached this decision even though,
statistically, a worker's risk of being infected with HIV as a member of
the emergency response unit was found to be minimal.7 The court's
holding seems reasonable given that the facts of this case closely
resemble the circumstances surrounding many of the occurrences of
HIV transmission in health care settings. Nonetheless, the court
narrowly tailored its decision to confer occupational disease status
only in those cases where specific criteria are met.8
The Department of Corrections decision sheds light not only on
the current state of workers' compensation coverage for HIV-infected
workers outside the health care field, but also on the need for greater
state legislative action to define the scope of occupationally
transmitted HIV coverage. In response to lawsuits seeking workers'
compensation benefits for occupationally transmitted HIV, some
states have enacted statutes that specifically address the conferral of
benefits to workers who contract HIV within the scope of their
employment. 9  However, these statutes are generally limited to
employees in certain professions and fail to provide an overarching
rule concerning the transmission of HIV in the workplace. 10 Thus, it
may be important for state legislatures to consider ways to modify
their statutes to explicitly expand or contract the rights of workers
who have contracted HIV in the workplace.
In modifying their workers' compensation statutes, states
should consider providing more extensive coverage to workers with
HIV. Currently, due to limitations in state compensation systems,
such as statutory time bars within which an employee must discover
the illness, many HIV-infected employees are not able to recover
workers' compensation coverage.1" Even in cases where benefits are
recovered, the amount of compensation is usually insufficient to cover
the large expenses associated with occupational diseases.
Furthermore, "coverage is especially weak for diseases that result in
6. Estate of Doe v. Dep't of Corr., 848 A.2d 378, 380 (Conn. 2004).
7. Id. at 393-94.
8. The court held that HIV was an occupational disease in this case because the
contraction of HIV was a "distinct" and "peculiar" incident of the decedent's position with the
emergency response unit, such that "there [was] a direct causal connection between the duties of
the employment and the disease contracted." Id. at 381-82.
9. See Paul Barron, State Statutes Dealing with HIV and AIDS: A Comprehensive State-by-
State Summary, 13 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2004) (summarizing HIV and AIDS related legislation
in the 50 states).
10. Id. The survey describes changes in state laws relating to HIV/AIDS and includes
information regarding employment law. For example, Alabama changed its law to allow
firefighters exposed to HIV on the job to receive workers' compensation. Id. at 6.
11. See infra Part II.B (discussing statute of limitations).
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death."12 For example, it is estimated that between "nine and forty-
two health care workers per million die annually from occupational
infection" 13 due, in part, to these gaps in workers' compensation
coverage. Thus, the workers' compensation system must be altered to
allow for increased coverage in light of the unique circumstances that
accompany infectious diseases, such as HIV.
The Doe decision and certain newly-enacted state statutes
bring to surface both old and new issues regarding workers'
compensation coverage for HIV-infected HCWs and the expansion of
this coverage to workers in other professions. How will the Doe
criteria affect occupational disease coverage for workers in other
professions with health risks? Will state guidelines help or hinder the
broadening of the scope of recovery for occupational diseases under
workers' compensation? This Note offers guidance for interpreting the
term "occupational disease" and argues that states should expand the
scope of workers' compensation statutes to provide greater coverage to
those employees who have contracted HIV in the workplace. Part II of
this Note explores the history of the workers' compensation system as
it relates to occupational diseases, as well as the development of state
guidelines explicitly addressing occupationally transmitted HIV. Part
III surveys the difficulties inherent in applying workers' compensation
standards to HIV cases. Part IV offers direction to states in
formulating new workers' compensation statutes to encompass the
needs of workers with occupationally transmitted HIV, while also
avoiding compensation claims where the disease is highly unlikely to
have derived from an occupational risk. For example, states should
lengthen statutes of limitations requirements which put a strict time
limit on occupational disease claims, while also conferring a statutory
presumption of causation to the narrow set of workers who are
regularly exposed to HIV. States could limit additional occupational
disease claims by requiring employees outside of this subset to adhere
to rigorous reporting and testing requirements. Part IV further
provides alternative methods of compensation for workers with
occupationally transmitted HIV and suggests steps that employers
and employees should take to limit occupational hazards and
compensation claims in light of several recent cases and new state
occupational disease guidelines.
12. J. Paul Leigh & John A. Robbins, Occupational Disease and Workers' Compensation:
Coverage, Costs, and Consequences, 82 MILBANK Q. 689, 709 (2004).
13. Kent A. Sepkowitz & Leon Eisenberg, Occupational Deaths among Healthcare Workers,
11 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1003, 1005 (July 2005), available at http://www.
cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/voll lnoO7/04-1038.htm.
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II. THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM
A. The "Injury by Accident" Requirement Under Workers'
Compensation
Workers' compensation is a state statutory system designed to
offer medical and financial benefits to workers who are injured in the
scope of their employment. The authority to create and operate the
workers' compensation system lies at the state level;14 there is no
analogous federal system of compensation. 15 Although each state has
its own compensation laws, most state statutory provisions are
substantially similar and can be discussed in terms of general
principles. 16
All state compensation statutes set forth coverage formulas
which provide that workers are automatically entitled to benefits in
cases of "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment." 17 An employee whose injury falls within this
definition is assured compensation regardless of who is at fault for the
injury.'8 This feature sets workers' compensation apart from the tort
liability scheme in which plaintiffs must prove fault.' 9 Thus, workers'
compensation provides a faster and easier method for injured workers
to recover costs as compared to the rigors of proving tort liability.
Consequently, the system also provides advantages for the employer.
In exchange for a no-fault liability system, the injured employee is
awarded only enough compensation to prevent destitution.20
Furthermore, for injuries covered by workers' compensation statutes,
benefits are the exclusive remedy against the employer,21 and the
employer obtains immunity from future litigation once the workers'
compensation requirements are met.22 Though there are several
judicially-created exceptions to the exclusive remedy doctrine, such as
14. JEFFREY V. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1 (2d ed. 1989).
15. Id. However, the federal government does provide coverage for maritime workers on
United States waters and to employees of the United States government. Id.
16. Id. at 2.
17. JACK B. HOOD ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYEE PROTECTION LAWS 59
(3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
18. Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: An
Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 407 (1998).
19. 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 1 (1995).
20. Id. § 1.03(5).
21. Id. § 1.01.
22. Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation Remedy
Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 407 (1988).
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case law which permits workers to also sue in tort, 23 workers'
compensation generally operates as a system of quid pro quo.
The "accidental injury" requirement under workers'
compensation schemes is one of the most important factors in
determining whether an injury is compensable. An accident is
generally described as "a tangible happening of a traumatic nature
from an unexpected cause resulting in either external or internal
physical harm. '24 States originally construed the term "accident" to
exclude non-traditional occupational injuries. 25 However, most courts
now interpret the term "accident" to encompass a wider range of
injuries, and a number of states have even eliminated the accidental
injury requirement altogether. 26
In those states that still retain the accidental injury
requirement, several elements must be established to prove that an
accidental injury is compensable. The most basic element of any
"accidental" injury is the unexpectedness or unusualness of the
injury.27 The injury must be "an unlooked for and untoward event
which is not expected or designed by the injured employee." 28  The
unexpectedness or unusualness of the injury can refer to the cause of
the injury or an unusual result of an employment practice, depending
on the state's laws.29 For instance, something as simple as a butcher
lifting a particularly heavy piece of meat which leads to a back injury
could be considered an unusual cause of injury.30 An unusual result
23. See Gabel et al., supra note 18, at 409-14 (discussing judicially created exceptions for
intentional torts, employers acting as third parties, and bad faith).
24. Kelly Corbett, Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome: Occupational Disease or Work-
Related Accident?, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 395, 404 (1997). Many states include a specific
definition of the phrase "by accident" in their workers' compensation statutes. These statutory
definitions vary to some extent, but generally confer a similar meaning. For instance, Nebraska
defines an "accident" as "an unexpected or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently,
with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of injury." NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 48-151 (2006). Some states do not explicitly define "accidental," but incorporate the
accident concept into their definitions of "injury." For example, the Montana statute defines
"injury" as "an unexpected traumatic incident or unusual strain resulting in either external or
internal physical harm." MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (2006). Nevada defines "injury" as "a
sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt
result." NEV. REV. STAT. § 616A.265 (2006). Whether defining "accident" or "injury," these
definitions all include the elements of unexpectedness and production of a tangible harm.
25. HOOD, supra note 17, at 81-82.
26. See 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 42.01 n.1 (noting that California, Colorado,
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South
Dakota omit the accidental injury requirement).
27. Id. § 42.02.
28. Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d 582, 584 (N.C. App. 1982) (quoting Harding v. Thomas
& Howard Co., 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (N.C. 1962)).
29. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 44.01.
30. Id. § 44.03.
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could be a bookkeeper having a heart attack after walking up the
stairs to his office. 31 Additionally, many jurisdictions require that the
accident be sudden and attributable to a definite time and place. 32
Though the unexpectedness and definiteness elements provide a basic
framework by which to identify the traditional industrial accident,
problems arise when attempting to apply these elements to instances
of disease transmission in the workplace.
B. Occupational Diseases
The inclusion of "diseases," as opposed to injuries, within the
framework of workers' compensation has long been a complicated
matter for state legislatures. Similarly, courts have been hesitant to
award compensation for occupational diseases. Early compensation
statutes did not contain provisions for occupational disease coverage. 33
Since diseases were not generally conceived of as health conditions
that could be acquired via occupational "accidents," states justified
this exclusion of diseases by narrowly interpreting the definition of
"injury by accident" in state coverage formulas.3 4 Furthermore, states
believed that private health insurance companies should exclusively
cover the treatment of diseases. 35
States have only recently accepted the inclusion of occupational
diseases in the definition of compensable injuries under workers'
compensation. This delayed acceptance is due in part to the two-
element accidental injury test adopted by many states. Though the
definitions of "unusual" and "definite" vary depending on each state's
guidelines, occupational diseases traditionally did not satisfy either
element. 36
In the 1920s, states began to integrate occupational diseases
into workers' compensation law by viewing the contraction of a disease
as an "accident" that involved the transmission of bacteria through
scratches.37 For diseases contracted this way, states considered the
skin abrasion itself as the accidental occurrence. By interpreting
disease as an accident that involved physical injury, occupational
diseases could more easily satisfy the two tests of unusualness and
31. Id. § 44.01.
32. Id. § 42.02.
33. HOOD, supra note 17, at 81-82.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 78.
36. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 42.02.
37. Id. § 51.02.
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definiteness. 38 Under this view, courts were finally able to apply the
two-element inquiry to find workers' compensation coverage for
disease. "Unusualness could be based on the 'abnormality' of the
method of entry," and definiteness of time was based on when the
scratch was obtained. "This notion of 'definite' was easier to grasp
than when illness was the result of gradual absorption or inhalation of
germs over an extended period."39
Eventually, states eliminated the requirement of an actual
physical scratch and began to view the "germ invasion itself' as the
traumatic episode. 40 By thus classifying the transmission of disease
as an accident, states enabled diseased workers to fulfill the "injury by
accident" requirement of workers' compensation statutes. States
characterized the "injury" as the progression of the disease resulting
from the accident. 41 Even though the "injury" may have taken time to
develop, diseased workers still satisfied the statutory mandate, 42 and
the accidental character of infectious diseases could not be "lost
[simply] by calling the consequential results a disease."43
Each state has now addressed the issue of occupational
diseases explicitly in its workers' compensation statutes. Unlike
statutory provisions defining accidents, modern occupational disease
provisions no longer require that a disease be unexpected, unintended
or sudden. 44 A common statutory definition of occupational disease is
the following: "a disease which is due to causes and conditions which
are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation,
process or employment, and shall exclude all ordinary diseases of life
to which the general public are exposed. '45  With legislative
recognition of occupational diseases came the elimination of the
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 51.03.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 128 A. 635, 639 (Md. 1925). However, it is
important to note that by grouping diseases under the definition of "accident," states did not take
into account the unique characteristics of diseases, such as latency periods. See Estate of Doe v.
Dep't of Corr., 848 A.2d 378, 380 (Conn. 2004) (debating whether HIV should be considered an
accidental injury with a one-year statute of limitations or an occupational disease with a three-
year statute of limitations).
44. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 44.01. See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE LAW AND
OCCUPATIONAL INJURY, DISEASE, AND DEATH 3 (1990) (distinguishing between statutory
definitions of "accident" and "occupational disease").
45. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 52.03(2) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.151(3)
(1995)).
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barrier to recovery that separated occupational diseases and accidents
into two distinct categories. 46
An essential element of contemporary occupational disease
provisions is the requirement that a plaintiff prove a causal
connection between the injury and employment. 47  Most statutes
require that the disease be "due to causes and conditions which are
characteristic of and peculiar to" the worker's occupation. 48 This
generally means that "the disease must be so distinctively associated
with the employee's occupation that there is a direct causal connection
between the duties of the employment and the disease contracted."49
Furthermore, to meet the "peculiarity" requirement, the claimant's
occupation must have substantially contributed to the progression of
the disease 50 or put the claimant at an increased risk of contracting
the disease.51
Where there is no concrete evidence of causation, courts must
rely on circumstantial evidence to determine whether there was
exposure to the disease sufficient to satisfy the causation
requirement. 52 The exact standards for causation differ from state to
state, but all courts require a substantial connection between the
worker's occupation and the transmission of disease. This strict
causation requirement means that employees who suffer from
occupational diseases will generally have a more difficult time
establishing a successful workers' compensation claim than those who
suffer accidents in the workplace. 53
46. See Estate of Doe, 848 A.2d at 385 (noting that the national trend is to define
"occupational disease" broadly to include "any disease arising out of exposure to harmful
conditions of the employment, when those conditions are present in a peculiar or increased
decree by comparison with employment generally" (internal quotations omitted)).
47. 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 51.06.
48. Id. § 52.03[1].
49. Russell v. Camden Cmty. Hosp., 359 A.2d 607, 612 (Me. 1976).
50. See Matthews v. City of Raleigh, 586 S.E.2d 829, 834 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
51. See Biasetti v. City of Stamford, 735 A.2d 321, 325-26 (Conn. 1999). The disease,
however, does not have to be unique to the employee's occupation. Id. at 326.
52. See Esposito v. N.Y.S. Willowbrook State Sch., 362 N.Y.S.2d 54, 55 (N.Y. App. Div.
1974) (holding that there was substantial evidence of a causal connection based on a doctor's
testimony that the claimant likely contracted hepatitis during his employment at a school for
retarded children because several children carried the infection in their stool and it was
transmitted in this manner ... [and] the children dirtied themselves with vomit and stool which
claimant had to clean off the dishes and the chairs on which they sat"); Booker v. Duke Med.
Ctr., 256 S.E.2d 189, 200 (N.C. 1979) ("In the case of occupational diseases proof of a causal
connection between the disease and the employee's occupation must of necessity be based on
circumstantial evidence.").
53. See Troyen A. Brennan, Ensuring Adequate Health Care for the Sick: The Challenge of
the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome as an Occupational Disease, 1988 DUKE L.J. 29, 58-59
2006] 945
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The requirement that the claimant's disease be peculiar to his
or her occupation may be hard to satisfy because the exact causes of
occupational diseases are often difficult to diagnose.54 For example,
an employee's activities outside the workplace may place her at as
great a risk for transmission of certain diseases as do her occupational
activities. Furthermore, it may be difficult to find evidence proving
that the employee acquired the disease in the course of employment
given the latency periods associated with many occupational
diseases.55 Failure to file an incident report with the employer after
each occurrence that could potentially cause transmission of disease to
the employee may exacerbate the difficulty of proving causation.
Claimants may also find it hard to comply with their state's statute of
limitations when filing a disability claim due to the length of time over
which a disease might develop. 56 Each of these factors creates a
substantial obstacle for injured claimants trying to meet the statutory
requirements for occupational disease recovery.
C. A Comparable Illness: Hepatitis as an Occupational Disease
Occupational disease provisions and judicial interpretation of
these provisions pre-date the discovery of HIV. Thus, previous
lawsuits involving the contraction of hepatitis, a disease transmitted
in the same way as HIV, may help determine the future of
occupationally transmitted HIV in workers' compensation cases.57
Decisions regarding whether the hepatitis virus satisfies the definition
of an occupational disease have varied depending on the exact
statutory language used in various jurisdictions. However, Booker v.
Duke Medical Center, a North Carolina Supreme Court case, presents
a starting point for judicial interpretation of the term "occupational
disease" in the hepatitis context. 58 In Booker, the court held that a
decedent's illness, caused by regular occupational exposure to
hepatitis, qualified as an occupational disease under workers'
(discussing how occupational disease causation is more difficult for workers' compensation
boards to process).
54. W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 63 (1984).
55. Id.
56. See id. ("In a few states, the period during which claims must be filed starts at the time
of the 'accident.' In cases involving latent injuries, some courts have interpreted 'accident' to
mean the initiating incident ... rather than the onset of the disability. In such states, the
statute of limitations may run before the worker realizes that he is the victim of a compensable
injury.").
57. See Brennan, supra note 53, at 61 ("Hepatitis is an especially good analogy to AIDS
because the transmission of this disease is biologically similar to HIV transmission.").
58. 256 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1979).
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compensation. 59 The decedent worked as a laboratory technician and
came into contact with hepatitis-infected blood daily while testing
blood samples. 60 He eventually contracted the disease and died from
it.61 In a workers' compensation suit brought by his survivors, the
court reasoned that diseases contracted in the scope of employment
should be considered occupational diseases so long as they are due to
causes which are peculiar to employment and are not simply ordinary
diseases of life.62 Additionally, the court found that the decedent's
illness could be classified as an occupational disease regardless of the
fact that it might also be considered an "injury by accident."63 As a
result of the classification of the decedent's illness as an occupational
disease, the court did not require proof of a causal relationship
between a specific exposure to the disease and the resulting illness.64
The Booker court did, however, list several key factors for
courts to consider in determining whether a causal relationship exists
between the disease and the worker's occupation. 65 These factors
included: "(1) the extent of exposure to the disease or disease-causing
agents during employment; (2) the extent of exposure outside
employment; and (3) the absence of the disease prior to the work-
related exposure as shown by the employee's medical history."66 Using
this list of factors, the Booker court ultimately reinstated the
decedent's workers' compensation award, finding that his contraction
of hepatitis satisfied the definition of occupational disease,67 and that
a causal link was established between his employment and
transmission of the disease.68
In some states, a claimant may be entitled to a rebuttable
presumption as to the causation element if her occupation presents a
59. Id. at 201-03.
60. Id. at 199.
61. Id. at 205.
62. Id. at 198. The requirement that the disease is not an "ordinary disease of life" does not
mean that the disease must originate "exclusively from the employment. [It] means that the
conditions of the employment must result in a hazard which distinguishes it in character from
employment generally." Id. at 199-200 (quoting Ritter v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 135 N.W.2d
470, 472 (Neb. 1965)).
63. Booker, 256 S.E.2d at 198. The court rejected the appellate court's reasoning that
"[b]ecause serum hepatitis is not a disease which develops gradually through prolonged exposure
to harmful conditions but instead is an illness caused by a single exposure to a virus .... it [is]
not compensable as an occupational disease." Id. at 197.
64. Id. at 197-98.
65. Id. at 200.
66. Id. These factors indicate courts are willing to consider circumstantial evidence in
determining whether a disease is contracted in the scope of employment.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 201.
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hazard of contracting the specific occupational disease in question. 69
For example, in City of Wilkes-Barre v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a
firefighter who died of heart disease was in an occupation where heart
disease was a hazard inherent to his employment.70 Thus, the
decedent was entitled to the presumption of causation available under
Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Act due to the increased risk
for exposure to the disease as a result of his occupation. 71
Other states, however, are not as permissive in granting
occupational disease claimants a presumption as to causation. For
example, in Carroll v. Town of Ayden a North Carolina court of
appeals implied that if an employee's occupation itself does not
present an increased risk, there can be no such presumption. 72
Moreover, in North Carolina, the presumption may be overcome, or
the claimant may fail to sustain the burden of proof, if the claimant is
exposed to outside risk factors for the disease prior to or concurrent
with employment. 73 In the case of hepatitis, for example, previous
blood transfusions, needle-sticks, or tattoos may raise questions
regarding causation.74 Consequently, if there is an outside risk of
contracting a disease, a plaintiff must provide sufficient medical
evidence to prove causation.75
D. HIV Coverage Under Workers' Compensation Statutes
The manner in which HIV is transmitted presents unique
problems in determining whether to classify the virus as an accidental
injury or an occupational disease under workers' compensation
schemes.76  Although HIV is unquestionably a "disease," the
69. E.g., City of Wilkes-Barre v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 664 A.2d 90, 92 (Pa. 1995)
(discussing Pennsylvania's statutory presumption).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Carroll v. Town of Ayden, 586 S.E.2d 822, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that
contact with raw sewage did not put employee at greater risk for contracting hepatitis).
73. See Crabb v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l Hosp., No. A-95-029, 1995 Neb. App. LEXIS 272, at
*13 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1995) (denying compensation on grounds that the plaintiff "had risk
factors for hepatitis C exposure and infection that predated her employment with" the
defendant).
74. Id. at "13.
75. See id. at *12 (requiring plaintiff to provide expert medical testimony to prove the
causal connection between her needle-stick and her contraction of hepatitis C because "the
nature and effect of [her] injury [were] not plainly apparent").
76. See Booker v. Duke Med. Ctr., 256 S.E.2d 189, 198 (N.C. 1979) (holding that decedent's
illness could be classified as an occupational disease regardless of the fact that it might also be
considered an "injury by accident").
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transmission of HIV may also be considered an "accidental injury" if
there is a definite place and time of exposure. 77 A claimant will have
no problem pursuing workers' compensation benefits for HIV
transmission as an accidental injury if the worker knows exactly when
and where the infectious transmission occurred. 78  However,
difficulties may arise when there is a long latency period between the
initial contraction of the disease and the appearance of symptoms, 79 or
when the worker is constantly exposed to the disease and is unable to
determine the exact moment of transmission.80  Under these
circumstances, the claimant will likely not have enough evidence to
prove that the disease was the result of a single accidental injury; thus
she will be forced to rely on occupational disease coverage. Moreover,
even if the claimant is able to identify a specific moment of
transmission, her claim may be barred by the state's statute of
limitations on accidental injury claims, but not by the statute of
limitations on occupational disease claims.81 Thus, it is essential to
understand how accidental injury and occupational disease claims
interact in the HIV context, and what types of evidence courts look for
in determining occupational disease coverage in HIV cases.
When an employee is exposed to HIV in the workplace, but
does not actually contract the disease, the incident is considered an
accidental injury under workers' compensation. The employee may
recover limited benefits for the exposure, such as the costs of testing
for the disease, but it is unlikely that extended benefits will be
recovered since there was no actual transmission. In Doe v. City of
Stamford, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered the limits of
compensation for HIV exposure when there was no actual
transmission of the disease in a non-health care setting.8 2 The court
held in this case that a police officer who was exposed to HIV after
indirect contact with a criminal suspect's bodily fluids83 was entitled
77. Barren River Dist. Health Dep't v. Hussey, No. 1998-CA-001387-WC, 2000 Ky. App.
LEXIS 39, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2000).
78. See 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 19, § 42.02 (holding that to qualify as "accidental,"
an injury "must be traceable, within reasonable limits, to a definite time, place, and occasion or
cause").
79. Given that an AIDS screening will not immediately test positive, the worker may
encounter problems proving a definite time and place of exposure for accidental injury
compensation even when he seeks immediate medical attention after possible exposure to the
disease.
80. See, e.g., Booker, 256 S.E.2d at 201 (noting that decedent was exposed to hepatitis-
infected blood on a daily basis).
81. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Dep't of Corr., 848 A.2d at 380 (Conn. 2004) (discussing the
expiration of the statute of limitations for accidental injuries, but not for occupational diseases).




to limited workers' compensation after testing negative for the
disease. 84 The court found that exposure to HIV could, in itself, be a
compensable "accidental injury" under the state's workers'
compensation statute if the contact resulted in the need for medical
treatment. 85 As a result, the officer was awarded compensation based
on the costs of pursuing medical treatment and monitoring following
his exposure to the disease. 86
Several other state courts have agreed that the risk of infection
of HIV is an injury under workers' compensation. For example, the
Oregon Court of Appeals in K-Mart v. Evenson stated that a showing
of actual harm was "not necessarily required to prove the existence of
a 'compensable injury' in a case where a store manager was exposed
to, but did not contract, HIV.8 7  The Oregon statute defined a
compensable injury as one requiring medical attention or resulting in
disability.8 8 Thus, if an employee is exposed to a disease such as HIV
and requires medical services simply because of the exposure, the
injury is likely to be found compensable as a traditional accidental
injury. 89
When an employee actually contracts HIV after exposure to the
disease in an occupational setting, courts have relied on the reasoning
employed in the hepatitis cases (especially with respect to causation)
to determine whether the claimant is entitled to occupational disease
coverage. 90 In Barren River District Health Department v. Hussey, for
example, a Kentucky appellate court ruled that, under the facts of the
case, HIV was an occupational disease because the nature of the
decedent's job put her at a greater risk for transmission than a
"member of the general public."91 The decedent worked as a registered
nurse, and her family believed that she had acquired the disease from
84. Id. at 53-54.
85. Id. at 56-57.
86. Id. at 57.
87. 1 P.3d 477, 478-79 (Ore. App. 2000).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 480; see also Arkansas Dept. of Correction v. Holybee, 878 S.W.2d 420, 420
(1994) (finding that the injury is the bite and risk of infection where a correction officer was
bitten by an HIV positive prisoner); Jackson Twp. Volunteer Fire Co. v. Workman's Comp.
Appeals Bd. (Wallet), 594 A.2d 826, 827-28 (holding that a fireman's occupational exposure to
AIDS was an "injury").
90. See, e.g., Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 256 S.E.2d 189, 200 (N.C. 1979) (listing factors,
such as the extent of exposure to the disease at work, that should be considered in determining
whether a causal connection exists between the disease and the claimant's occupation when
there is an absence of specific evidence of a occupational transmission).
91. No. 1998-CA-001387-WC, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 39, at *12-13 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 14,
2000).
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a needle-stick after drawing blood from an infected patient.92
However, there was no evidence of a specific episode of transmission,
such as a reported needle-stick injury in the employer's records, which
could be used to recover benefits under an accidental injury
standard. 93 Nonetheless, the decedent did work predominantly with
HIV patients as part of her occupation. 94 The court held that the
decedent's estate had satisfied the causation requirement for
occupational disease compensation because the decedent's job as a
nurse required interaction with HIV patients, putting her at an
increased risk of transmission of the disease. 95 In making its decision,
the court distinguished between "mere exposure to a general health
care work environment and a work environment known to have within
it patients who are HIV infected." 96 Thus, the court did not extend its
reasoning to HCWs in general because it found no conclusive evidence
that all HCWs were at a greater risk for contraction of HIV than the
general population. 97
In Artiste v. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center, a New York
court supported the Barren River court's rejection of presumptive
occupational disease coverage for HCWs.98 In Artiste, the court denied
a nurse's aide's occupational disease claim for the transmission of HIV
because there was no evidence that exposure to blood or blood
products was a "generally recognized risk" of her occupation. 99 The
evidence presented to the court explained that nurse's aides are
primarily responsible for changing linens and attending to patients'
personal needs; they are not, like nurses, responsible for injecting
patients with medications. 100 Accordingly, the court came to its ruling
by examining the hazards inherent in being a nurse's aide, 101
concluding that the risk of transmission of HIV is not a "natural
incident" of being a nurse's aide, nor is it a hazard unique to the
occupation. 10 2  Thus, the Artiste court set limits on occupational
92. Id. at *1-3.
93. The exact occurrence of transmission of the disease was unknown because there was "no
report in [the decedent's] file regarding an incident that exposed her to the disease, and
statements made to witnesses [were] vague and inconsistent as to when the needle stick
occurred." Id. at *8.
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id. at *13.
96. Id. at *19.
97. Id. at*13.
98. Artiste v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 221 A.D.2d 81, 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 83-84.
101. Id. at 84.
102. Id. at 83-84.
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disease coverage for HCWs based on a claimant's general employment
status in the medical setting and the worker's corresponding job
responsibilities. 103 The court's reasoning would tend to deny workers'
compensation benefits for any nurse's aide who contracted HIV, even
if there was strong, but indefinite, evidence of occupational
transmission. 104
Not all courts are as limited in the extension of the "generally
recognized risk" test for causation in occupationally transmitted HIV
cases as precedent might suggest. For example, the Connecticut
Supreme Court recently employed a more lenient definition of
"occupational disease" to extend occupational disease coverage to an
HIV-infected prison employee. In Estate of Doe v. Department of
Corrections, a correction officer contracted HIV as a result of his
contact with an inmate's bodily fluids in the course of his employment
with the facility's emergency response unit. 10 5 Because the one-year
statute of limitations for accidental injuries had expired, the
decedent's estate argued that HIV transmission was an occupational
disease as opposed to an accidental injury.106 The court agreed,
holding that the transmission of HIV was an occupational disease
because the decedent's job position entailed a greater risk of
transmission of the disease than did other kinds of employment. 10 7
While corrections officers in general may not be considered at greater
risk for transmission than the general population, the decedent's
position on the emergency response team put him in "physical contact
with the inmates, often in situations where blood and other bodily
fluids that transmit[ted] HIV [were] present."108 The court found the
risk increased because HIV is "unusually prevalent" in the United
States prison population.10 9 Thus, the court determined that there
was proximate causation between the decedent's employment and the
transmission of HJV, concluding that compensation was warranted. 110
103. Id.
104. The transmission may be compensated as an "accidental injury" if there is a definite
place and time of exposure. However, if the evidence of transmission is strong, but indefinite,
and the infectious transmission is not a "generally recognized risk" of the claimant's occupation,
the claimant may not be able to recover under either an accidental injury or an occupational
disease theory.
105. 848 A.2d 378, 380 (2004).
106. Id. at 380.
107. Id. at 384.
108. Id. at 385.
109. Id. at 384.
110. Id. at 382. It should be noted, however, that the court's decision is limited to other
employees whose occupational duties put them at a similarly increased risk for infection. Id. at
384-85.
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E. State Legislative Responses
The line of case law dealing with occupationally transmitted
HIV prompted several state legislatures to enact specific provisions
under their workers' compensation statutes regarding HIV. Many of
these provisions give presumptive compensation only to workers in the
specific occupations listed in the state's statute. For example, the
Alabama statute unambiguously states that firefighters who contract
HIV in the scope of employment are entitled to disability benefits."'
New York has very precise statutes which provide that emergency
medical technicians and correctional officers who contract HIV in the
scope of employment "will be presumed to have contracted such
disease as a natural and proximate result of an accidental injury" at
work. 112 The Virginia statute's list of qualified occupations similarly
includes firefighters, paramedics, emergency medical technicians,
police officers, and sheriffs. 113 Members of these occupations who are
exposed to HIV on the job and contract the disease are presumed to
have contracted HIV as a result of employment and automatically
qualify for occupational disease coverage under workers'
compensation. 114
Other states have chosen a different approach and look to the
date on which the injury is reported to determine whether the
workers' compensation scheme applies. The Kentucky statute, for
instance, notes that compensation stemming from occupational
exposure to HIV is barred unless notice of injurious exposure is given
as soon as practicable after the exposure.11 5  The Texas statute
requires employees claiming occupationally transmitted HIV to
provide the employer with a sworn affidavit of the date and
circumstances of the exposure and to document that, not later than
ten days after the date of exposure, the employee had a test result
that indicated an absence of HIV infection. 1 6
111. ALA. CODE § 11-43-144 (2006).
112. N.Y. GEN MUN. LAW §§ 207-o, 207-n (2006).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-402.1 (2006). However, Virginia also requires that these
employees file for workers' compensation "within two years after a positive HIV test." VA. CODE
ANN. § 65.2-406.
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-402.1 (2006).
115. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.185 (2006):
The right to compensation under this chapter resulting from work-related exposure to
the human immunodeficiency virus shall be barred unless notice of the injurious
exposure is given in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and unless an
application for adjustment of claim for compensation shall have been made with the
executive director within five (5) years after the injurious exposure to the virus.
116, See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.050 (2006) (stating that "not later than the
10th day after the date of the exposure, the employee had a test result that indicated an absence
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Another statutory device for determining when a worker with
HIV has a compensable occupational disease is to impose time
prohibitions on reporting incidents of exposure in conjunction with
mandatory testing for the disease. Nevada considers HIV to be a
compensable occupational disease if: (1) the worker was exposed to
HIV or AIDS during the course and scope of his employment; (2) the
employee reported the exposure to his employer in compliance with
reporting requirements; 117 and (3) the employee is screened for HIV
and tests positive within a certain timeframe.118 The employee is
barred from collecting benefits if he refuses to undergo the required
tests or if the employer proves that the contraction of HIV did not
occur in the occupational setting. 19
The various state statutes mentioned above illustrate that
some state legislatures have given careful consideration to the scope of
HIV as an occupational disease. However, there are many more states
that need guidance in the development of occupationally transmitted
HIV statutes in order to prevent frivolous claims as well as to provide
protection to workers in hazardous occupations. States may choose to
give presumptive coverage to a certain class of workers, impose time
limits and procedural requirements on reporting, employ mandatory
testing, or utilize some combination of these methods. Regardless of
the method chosen, the adoption of new state compensation
restrictions in the HIV context will lessen confusion as to the
distribution of workers' compensation rights and put certain
employees on notice about the procedural steps that they must take in
order to secure these rights.
III. THE DIFFICULTY OF APPLYING WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
TORTS STANDARDS TO OCCUPATIONALLY TRANSMITTED HIV CASES
A. Limitations on Obtaining Occupational Disease Coverage
A significant portion of the costs associated with occupational
diseases are not covered by most state workers' compensation
statutes. Approximately 269,500 new cases of occupational illness
of the reportable disease, including HIV infection"). A negative test result within 10 days
indicates that the employee was HIV negative at the time of the occupational exposure.
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were reported in the private sector in 2003.120 However, the actual
incidence of occupational disease is even greater because this figure
excludes the largely underreported occurrences of illnesses that
develop over long periods of time, such as HIV. 121 Thus, some victims
of latent occupational diseases may never recover for their injuries.
Moreover, even when workers do prove their occupational disease
claims, occupational disease awards account for a surprisingly small
part of the funds paid out under workers' compensation. Some
estimate that workers' compensation pays, at most, 20 percent of the
costs associated with occupational diseases.' 22 The effect of this low
payout is that most of the costs not covered by workers' compensation
are shifted to the employee, his family, Medicaid, Medicare, and
private insurers. 123 These facts raise the question: why does the
incidence of occupational illness remain high, while the amount that
victims are compensated decreases?
In an efficient world, market forces would prevent low payouts
to occupational disease claimants by dictating "efficient levels of
health hazards and equitable compensation for diseased workers."124
Health hazards are at an "efficient level" when the cost of
implementing new safety measures is offset by the "social value of
[the] precaution."'125 Employers would be prompted to take extra
precautions when the cost of the measure is less than the resulting
reduction in risk premiums. 26 Maximum efficiency also hinges on the
ability of workers to demand appropriate wage premiums and
insurance coverage depending on the risk involved in the
occupation. 27
In reality, however, we do not live in an efficient world, and
workplace conditions almost never lead to the most efficient result for
occupational disease prevention and compensation. A majority of
workers do not fully understand the risks associated with their
occupation and do not have the financial freedom to shop around for
120. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Workplace Injuries and Illnesses in 2003
(Dec. 14, 2004).
121. Id.
122. Leigh & Robbins, supra note 12, at 709.
123. Id. at 710.
124. Viscusi, supra note 54, at 56.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 57.
127. Id.; Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory Reform,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 605 (1996) ("A wage premium is the extra compensation that an




optimal employment.128  This leads workers to demand lower
premiums and coverage than they otherwise would. 129 As a result,
employers have less economic "incentive to reduce workplace health
hazards" than they would if employees were "fully cognizant of the
risks of occupational disease."'130 Thus, workplace injuries become
more frequent. The ensuing market failure creates a need for
government intervention to achieve the most socially desirable result.
In the early 1970s, the failure of the market-driven system
forced the federal government to take affirmative steps in dealing with
the occupational disease dilemma. The federal government passed the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA") which was
aimed at ensuring that the nation's workers had "safe and healthful
working conditions."'131 This statute and the rules promulgated under
OSHA, however, have failed to meet the expectations of many
regarding safety and cost-effectiveness. As of 1995, OSHA's
mandatory safety standards cost approximately $11 billion per year,
but resulted in only $3.6 billion worth of benefits each year from the
prevention of deaths and injuries. 132 Likewise, studies show that
OSHA's inspection and deterrence efforts have had only minimal
effects on the reduction of workplace injuries. 133
The dual failure of the market-force paradigm and OSHA's
policies to improve workplace safety and decrease the number of
occupational injuries has left the workers' compensation system
overwhelmed with injury and illness claims. The aggregate financial
impact of these claims could pose problems for the states and
employers who pay the claims. Thus, states employ a number of
mechanisms, such as statute of limitations restrictions, in their
workers' compensation systems to limit the number of claimants who
actually receive compensation.
States use the causation requirement in the definition of
occupational disease and the statute of limitations restrictions to limit
the number of occupational disease claims that may be filed.134 A
causal link between the disease and the claimant's employment may
be difficult to prove if the disease is not traditionally associated with
128. See Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An Informal
Approach to Workplace Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1025 (2004) ("[Pirospective
employees are not privy to, and cannot easily obtain, the accident and injury data necessary to
determine the relative safety risks presented at a workplace.").
129. Viscusi, supra note 54, at 59.
130. Id.
131. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006).
132. Lambert, supra note 128, at 1010.
133. Id. at 1011.
134. See supra Part II.B.
956 [Vol. 59:3:937
HIVAS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
the claimant's occupation or if the claimant has engaged in outside
behavior that also puts him at risk for the disease. Moreover, the
purpose of a statute of limitations is to put a time restriction on
occupational disease recovery, so that claimants who do not file before
a certain deadline lose their compensation recovery rights. The
lengthiness of workers' compensation proceedings also operates to
reduce individual compensation awards. In fact, employees often
settle injury and illness claims for less than they are worth because
they cannot afford to wait for the outcome of these proceedings. 135
Further compounding the problem is the fact that most employers are
not held liable for occupational illness coverage under workers'
compensation. 136 "Employers are six times more likely to contest a
disease claim than an accident claim."137  Additionally, some state
statutes limit the scope of occupational disease coverage to specified
occupations or illnesses, 138 and a number of courts have narrowly
interpreted the definition of "occupational disease" so as to exclude
coverage. 139
As a result of these factors, occupational disease awards
account for a mere 2 to 3 percent of workers' compensation
payments, 40 and only around 5 percent of occupational disease
claimants receive compensation. 14 1  Furthermore, the workers'
compensation system does not provide any benefits for between 91 and
99 percent of all the deaths that epidemiological estimates attribute to
occupational disease.' 42 These statistics are staggering and provide a
clear picture of the crisis faced by victims of occupational diseases. A
significant majority of sick workers will never obtain the assistance
135. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 127, at 607.
136. Id. at 599.
137. Viscusi, supra note 54, at 64.
138. See supra Part II.E. For example, Ohio lists numerous diseases, from anthrax to
silicosis, that are presumed to be compensable occupational diseases. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4123.68 (2006). Michigan makes it easier for police officers, conservation officers, and motor
carrier inspectors to obtain occupational disease coverage when suffering from respiratory and
heart diseases. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.405 (2006).
139. See supra Part IID; Carroll v. Town of Ayden, 586 S.E.2d 822, 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(interpreting occupational disease narrowly to determine that claimant was not at increased risk
for contraction of hepatitis); Artiste v. Kingsbrook Med. Ctr., 645 N.Y.S. 593, 595 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (interpreting occupational disease statute to deny benefits to nurse's aide because HIV
transmission was not a generally recognized risk of her occupation).
140. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 127, at 599-600 (citing Elinor P. Schroeder & Sidney A.
Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Information,
72 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1245 (1984)).
141. NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING
ENVIRONMENT 237 (1991).
142. Leigh & Robbins, supra note 12, at 709.
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they need, and the problem of occupational illness continues to be
undeterred by OSHA or market forces.
B. The Current Workers' Compensation System Is Inadequate to
Handle HIV
Even if an employee receives benefits, the compensation
dispensed to injured employees under the current workers'
compensation system often leaves employees insufficiently
compensated for their injuries. 143  This is especially the case for
victims of occupational diseases because, on average, they receive
lower benefits than victims of occupational accidents. 144 Furthermore,
"the average disabled worker must wait 1 year before receiving the
first benefits payment."'145
HIV infected workers are disproportionately affected by these
shortcomings due to both the tremendous cost of HIV medications and
treatment and the urgency with which HIV infected workers must
receive treatment. HIV care in the United States costs an average of
$20,000 per patient, per year.146 Although each patient will react
differently to various antiretroviral drugs, these medications "help
suppress HIV and can stave off illness for years."'147 However, if a
patient stops taking medication, the potency of the virus can return in
an even more aggressive fashion. 148 Thus, victims of occupationally
transmitted AIDS will suffer if not given adequate funds to cover part
of their life-prolonging medications.
Because workers' compensation is merely an income
supplement, 149 payment under workers' compensation poses an acute
problem for employees who contract HIV in the workplace. Even with
modern medicine, employees infected with HIV will probably require
more time away from work than victims of other occupational
diseases. Furthermore, some infected workers may discover their
143. Compensation is generally calculated to be two-thirds of pre-accident wages, subject to a
state maximum. See PETER M. LENCSIS, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 52
(1998) (citing UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1997 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAWS 26-31 (1997)).
144. Viscusi, supra note 54, at 64.
145. Tereskerz & Jagger, supra note 5, at 1560.
146. Samuel A. Bozzette et al., The Care of HIV-Infected Adults in the United States, 339
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1897 (1998).
147. Rebecca Deuser, Cutting-Edge Research Yields Better HIV Drugs, SENTINEL &
ENTERPRISE (Fitchburg, Mass.), Nov. 22, 2004.
148. Id.
149. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT § 5.20
(2d ed. 1992).
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status too late to ever be healthy enough to return to work. HIV-
infected workers may also be dependent on workers' compensation
funds for a longer period of time than other ill workers given the ways
that new drugs are able to extend a patient's lifespan.
In addition the problem of inadequate coverage for
occupational disease claimants, the current workers' compensation
system distributes far more generous death benefits to accident
victims than to occupational disease victims. For example, in past
years, the average death benefit provided to families of accident
victims has been more than sixteen times greater than the
compensation provided to families of occupational disease victims.150
The substantial differences between occupational disease and
occupational injury coverage demonstrate that states should revamp
current workers' compensation systems in order to address the special
needs of occupational disease claimants, especially HIV-infected
employees. One such way to standardize occupational disease
recovery may be for courts and state legislatures to clarify the
requirements necessary to prove causation under the definition of
"occupational disease."
C. The "Increased Risk" Test
To be compensable, an occupational disease must be caused by
conditions which are "characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
occupation." Although this causation element is essential to proving
that there has been a compensable harm, the specific meaning of the
statutory definition151 may be hard for workers' compensation
claimants to discern. Fortunately, a number of courts have provided
guidance in interpreting the causation element. Courts will presume
that an occupational disease was caused by workplace conditions
"characteristic of and peculiar to employment" if the employee can
demonstrate that his occupation exposed him to an increased risk of
disease transmission. 15 2 However, courts in different jurisdictions
have used slightly different standards when applying the "increased
risk" test in occupationally transmitted HIV cases. The varying
interpretations are exemplified by the Barren River, Artiste, and
Estate of Doe decisions.
In Barren River, for instance, the court found that there was an
increased risk of transmission of HIV where the employee worked
150. Brennan, supra note 53, at 63.




primarily with HIV positive patients. 153 The court seemed to imply
that a greater risk of transmission only exists when the employee
knows that HIV-infected persons or HIV-contaminated substances are
located in the workplace. 154 According to this court's interpretation,
the "increased risk" test is not merely a function of the type of
workplace, but also of the employee's knowledge of characteristics in
the workplace. 155 At first glance, this holding appears logical, but the
court's knowledge requirement may disregard the purpose and spirit
of workers' compensation coverage. The requirement would preclude
employees from receiving coverage when they are actually infected in
the scope of employment, but are unable to pinpoint a discrete episode
of transmission and were personally unaware of the heightened risks
in the workplace. As a practical matter, it may also be hard to prove
that an individual employee subjectively did or did not possess
knowledge of the risks in the workplace.
The Artiste decision differs somewhat from Barren River in
that it offers a "generally recognized risk" test.156 Whereas Barren
River examines the risk of transmission for each individual claimant
based on that claimant's knowledge, Artiste focuses on the general
risks inherent in the claimant's profession. 15 7 According to the Artiste
court, if a claimant's occupation does not generally entail performing
duties that would increase the risk of occupational infection, then it
will be exceedingly difficult to prove occupational transmission. It is
unlikely that a causal connection between contraction of the disease
and the employee's occupation exists if members of that occupation
have no responsibilities which would place them in contact with
disease-transmitting persons or items. Thus, the Artiste court's
objective "generally recognized risk" test appears to effectively
compensate the majority of workers who are infected with
occupational diseases, while also presumptively denying compensation
where the nature of the worker's occupation makes transmission of
the disease unlikely.
The court in Estate of Doe also judged the risk of transmission
by examining the hazards inherent in the employee's occupation. 58
However, this court seemed more willing than the Artiste court to
153. See supra Part II.D.
154. Id.
155. For example, an employee is not at an increased risk solely because she works in a
hospital. The employee must be aware of the presence of HIV positive persons or things in the
hospital to be considered at an increased risk.
156. See supra Part II.D.
157. Id.
158. See supra Part II.D (discussing Estate of Doe in detail).
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consider specific factors that might put an individual worker at
greater risk for transmission than someone else in her general
occupation. The court considered both the risks generally associated
with the claimant's occupation as a corrections officer and the specific
circumstances which led to his occupational infection to determine
whether the job placed the employee at an increased risk of
transmission of the disease. 159 Thus, the Estate of Doe court employs a
test that examines both individual risk factors and occupationally-
based risk factors. The decision seems to create a variant of the
"generally recognized risk" test whereby the risks associated with an
individual employee's job duties may be considered in granting
compensation, even when the employee's profession is not universally
recognized as being at an increased risk for contraction of the disease.
It may be difficult for a claimant with occupationally
transmitted HIV to prove that her condition is an occupational disease
caused by conditions which are "characteristic of and peculiar to her
particular occupation," especially if the claimant is employed outside
the health care industry. However, judicial interpretations of this
statutory requirement, embodied in the increased risk test, have made
it easier for some claimants to prove that their injury was work-
related. Currently, the extent to which the boundaries of occupational
disease coverage can be stretched in order to include unconventional
occupations will be determined by the variation of the increased risk
test adopted by the court. Thus, states should adopt a standardized
test for determining occupational disease causation in order to
enhance uniformity and predictability of workers' compensation
claims.
D. The Viability of Tort Action
If the workers' compensation scheme fails to adequately
compensate an occupational disease victim, the victim may wish to sue
in tort. However, the nature of the benefit makes it difficult to act
against an employer outside the workers' compensation scheme.
Employees who are eligible for workers' compensation have exchanged
their common law right to sue their employer for scheduled payments
in case of injury. 160 Thus, workers' compensation is deemed the
exclusive remedy against the employer and insurance carrier for
159. Id.
160. Brennan, supra note 53, at 51-52.
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occupational injuries. 161 The most frequently touted exception to the
exclusivity doctrine is the intentional tort exception, which allows an
employee to bring a common law action for damages when the
employer intentionally inflicts injury on the employee. 162
At first glance, this exception seems impractical in the case of
occupationally transmitted HIV since it is unlikely that an employer
would intentionally cause the employee's HIV infection. 163 However,
an employee could argue that an employer falls within this exception
if he allows an HIV-infected worker to return to the workplace with
the knowledge that his actions are substantially certain to result in
injury, such as transmission of HIV, to another employee. 164 Though
this argument may seem promising, in practice, it is unlikely to apply
since very few workplaces present so great a risk of transmission that
the employer would be substantially certain that another employee
would become infected. Thus, a court would likely find a tort suit
against the employer frivolous where the employer merely allows an
infected employee to return to work.
Employees who are infected in the workplace by another
person may attempt to gain compensation by suing the person who
infected them ("infector"). Employees could try to sue their infectors
under a theory of negligence for failure to disclose HIV status. 65
Under this theory, an employee's primary challenge will be to
demonstrate that the infector had a duty to disclose her status, but
failed to do so. 166 The employee will also have to show breach of duty,
a causal connection between the breach and harm, and a resulting
injury. For the initial duty inquiry, the court must ask whether it is
reasonable under the circumstances for the infector to disclose her
HIV status to the employee. 67 This inquiry may be realistic when
dealing with infections acquired in the health care setting, but
becomes more complicated when considering occupational
transmissions outside such an environment. An HIV-positive patient
in the medical setting is usually able to weigh the risks and benefits of
disclosure before interacting with the health care worker. However, in
cases where policemen, firemen, or emergency medical technicians are
161. 6 LARSON, supra note 19, § 100.01.
162. Brennan, supra note 53, at 52.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 52 n.121.
165. Richard DeNatale & Shawn D. Parrish, Health Care Workers'Ability to Recover in Tort
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infected, the infector may not have time to perform a cost-benefit
analysis before coming into contact with the employee. In these
emergency situations, it is unreasonable to expect infectors to disclose
their status before interacting with the employee. Thus, it would be
irrational for a court to impose a duty of disclosure on the infector.
Creating a duty of disclosure could also cause psychological and
physical harm for HIV-infected persons who would be forced to
broadcast their status. Considering the minute risk of transmission,
disclosure would likely also generate a disproportionate amount of
fear in those persons who come into contact with the infected. This
fear, in turn, might prevent the HIV-infected person from receiving
the assistance he needs from employees, and it could lead to others
stigmatizing the infected. Although a very small number of HIV
transmissions might be prevented, the harms seem to outweigh the
benefits of disclosure. Thus, a negligence action against the infector is
probably not an adequate solution to providing additional
compensation to an infected employee. Given the failures of the
present workers' compensation system and tort law to compensate
employees with occupational diseases, states should reform workers'
compensation schemes to provide a more adequate method of coverage
for these employees.
IV. PROVIDING CLARITY AND EFFICIENCY IN HANDLING OCCUPATIONAL
HIV CLAIMS
A. Rethinking State Workers' Compensation Schemes
State legislatures should adopt clear statutory guidelines
regarding HIV transmission as the first step toward eliminating
confusion in occupational disease cases. Specifically, states should act
to broaden the definition of occupational disease under their workers'
compensation statutes. 168 In order to provide effective occupational
disease coverage, states should revise the causation requirement in
the statutory definition of occupational disease and also set forth
specific occupations and corresponding diseases that are
presumptively, but not exclusively, covered under workers'
compensation. Moreover, states should extend statutes of limitations
168. See Tereskerz & Jagger, supra note 5, at 1561 ("[T]he definition of occupational disease
should be broadened where necessary so that every jurisdiction will allow compensation for
employees who can reasonably demonstrate that they did not acquire the disease from another
source and that their occupation put them at increased risk of the disease.").
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where they impede reasonable disease claims and address disparities
between accidental injury and occupational disease benefits. These
measures will result in more adequate workers' compensation
coverage for many HIV-infected workers and other underrepresented
occupational disease victims.
Most statutes currently condition eligibility for workers'
compensation for occupational diseases on proof that the disease is
"due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar
to" the worker's occupation. 169  States should change this strict
causation requirement by replacing it with a rebuttable presumption
that the claimant obtained the disease at work. In order to obtain this
presumption, the claimant would need only to show that her
occupation exposed her to an increased risk for contracting a
particular disease. 170 Specifically, states should adopt the Estate of
Doe increased risk test which takes into account both the risks
generally associated with the worker's occupation and the specific
circumstances which led to the employee's occupational infection. 171
Thus, an employee in an occupation not traditionally associated with
transmission of a certain disease may still gain workers' compensation
if she can demonstrate that her specific job duties regularly put her at
risk for exposure to the disease. However, if an employee is not in an
occupation generally associated with an increased risk of disease, and
the employee does not generally face risk of transmission in
performing her individual job duties, there should be no presumption
of occupational disease compensation.
States should elucidate the causation requirement found
within most definitions of occupational disease by incorporating a
provision that sets forth the increased risk test and the rebuttable
presumption utilized in Estate of Doe. The presumption created by
satisfying the increased risk test significantly lessens the evidentiary
burden on occupational disease claimants. After the claimant
demonstrates that the occupation exposed her to an increased risk for
the disease, the burden of proof shifts to the state to show that outside
factors, rather than the workplace environment, contributed to the
transmission. This reduced burden will facilitate compensation for
those infected workers who may not be able to produce clear evidence
that they contracted the disease from work. Given the problematic
169. 2 LARSON, supra note 19, § 51.06.
170. Estate of Doe v. Dep't of Corr., 848 A.2d 378, 384 (Conn. 2004); see also discussion supra
Part III.C (discussing the increased risk test).
171. Id. at 383-84.
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nature of obtaining benefits for occupational illnesses, this change in
the causation requirement should apply to all occupational diseases. 172
When amending their statutes, states should not limit coverage
for occupationally transmitted HIV to a specific list of occupations.
Granting compensation exclusively to workers in designated
occupations will result in the automatic denial of coverage to
employees in other occupations, even if these employees have valid
claims. 173 Thus, it is in a state's best interest to set forth a list of
diseases and corresponding occupations that are presumptively
covered. This will enable the state to reduce some of the
administrative burden of determining coverage and to deter persons
outside of those specified occupations from bringing claims that are
not likely to have arisen in the scope of employment. The statute
should then stipulate that while infected members of the listed
occupations automatically qualify for compensation, workers in other
professions are not excluded from bringing a claim.174 Furthermore,
the law should explicitly state that employers of workers in the
presumptive coverage categories are always able to rebut the
presumption by introducing evidence of outside activities that also put
the worker at risk for the disease. This statutory scheme would shift
the burden of proving occupational disease status away from those
workers in the statutorily designated occupations, but would still
allow members of other occupations to receive compensation if they
can satisfy a more rigorous causation requirement.
Employing strict timetables for reporting or insisting on
extensive documentation may exclude certain legitimate claimants
from recovery. Therefore, states should not adopt this approach. For
example, statutes in Texas and Nevada require documentation of a
negative HIV test within a short time period after exposure in order to
qualify for occupational disease coverage. 175 These states presume
that a negative test result within a short period of time indicates that
the employee was free of the disease before the occupational incident.
However, these provisions could exclude people who are continually
exposed to HIV in the workplace and thus cannot identify any single
event of exposure. In addition, employees who are not familiar with
172. See Tereskerz & Jagger, supra note 5, at 1561.
173. This is similar to the reasoning employed in Artiste. See supra Part ILI.C (discussing,
among other interpretations, the Artiste court's reasoning in employing an objective "generally
recognized risk" test).
174. New York and Virginia utilize this occupational disease compensation scheme. See
supra Part II.E.




the statutory procedure may also be excluded if they delay HIV testing
after exposure. Although timing mechanisms such as those employed
in Texas and Nevada make it easy to determine which employees are
entitled to compensation, the provisions also require infected workers
to have intimate knowledge of the statutory requirements.
States should instead expand the statute of limitations under
workers' compensation to cover those workers who may initially be
asymptomatic. 176  They should adopt provisions stating that the
statute of limitations for occupational diseases does not commence
until the employee has "knowledge, or a reasonable belief, or through
ordinary diligence could have discovered, that the occupational disease
or death was work related."177 This ensures that a claimant will have
adequate opportunity to file a workers' compensation claim after
initial discovery of the disease. The adoption of a more expansive
statute of limitations for occupational disease claims is an additional
statutory modification that will enable employees to successfully
obtain coverage that might otherwise be prohibited because of the
dormant nature of many infectious diseases.
In re-thinking their workers' compensation schemes, states
should also consider expanding compensation to provide more
coverage to employees with fatal diseases. Although an increase in
the amount of coverage would cause some increase in insurance
premiums, infectious diseases represent only a small percentage of all
occupational diseases. Thus, implementing measures which seek to
expand occupational disease coverage for a smaller class of infectious
diseases such as HIV will have a much lighter economic impact on the
workers' compensation system than providing increased coverage for
every existing occurrence of occupational disease. As a result, a slight
increase in workers' compensation insurance premiums may be
sufficient to cover increased infectious disease compensation.
Furthermore, an efficient compromise may be reached by making
trade-offs between increasing compensation benefits for infected
workers under the current system and implementing new statutory
criteria to increase the number of employees who will qualify for
coverage. For example, instead of implementing the above
suggestions regarding the lessening of statutory requirements for
occupational disease coverage, the state may instead choose to provide
more coverage for those who are able to meet the more stringent
requirements. Thus, a reasonable increase in benefits for claimants
with infectious diseases may be possible if the state deems such a
176. See Tereskerz & Jagger, supra note 5, at 1561.
177. MICH. COMP. LAws § 418.441 (2006).
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result more socially desirable than other proposed amendments to the
workers compensation system.
B. Alternative Compensation Schemes for HIV Victims
In addition to statutory and legal remedies, the problem of
providing adequate occupational disease coverage may also be
resolved by focusing on the inefficiencies in the market system that
cause workers to receive lower wage premiums for the occupational
risks they undertake. For example, information on the risks of
contracting occupational diseases in various workplaces should be
more efficiently distributed. This information should be directed at
both employees and employers who, respectively, would be able to
more accurately weigh the risks of accepting employment and design
better safety mechanisms to prevent the problem. Workers could
bargain for higher wage premiums with the risks of the occupation in
mind if more information is distributed about the risks of employment.
With higher wage premiums, workers' compensation recovery would
also increase since compensation is generally formulated as a
percentage of income. Greater compensation would allow those
workers who have been infected with HIV to receive the treatment
and medication they require. OSHA penalties for noncompliance with
health and safety standards could also be increased to make it
inefficient for employers to avoid implementing safety standards. 178
Thus, employers would have an independent incentive for initiating
higher safety standards.
In addition to the above suggestions, workers' compensation
statutes could also be amended to include HIV as a type of
occupational disease. This would eliminate some of the burden
normally put on claimants to collect evidence of an increased risk of
transmission in the workplace. Furthermore, the statute of
limitations in many states could be extended for occupational disease
claims to put less restrictions on workers with latent illnesses or
workers who need more time to collect evidence.
States could also update or revise the workers' compensation
formulas to ensure that occupational disease claimants receive awards
on par with those of accident victims. The formulas would have to
consider the special costs involved in caring for an HIV-positive person
and adjust compensation levels accordingly. However, the workers'
compensation system should not be expected to compensate a worker
fully for the costs associated with HIV treatment. Paying the
178. Viscusi, supra note 54, at 80.
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exorbitant amount required to adequately care for someone with HIV
would conflict with the no-fault theory of workers' compensation. 179
While an employer should not pay the total costs for HIV treatment,
HLV-infected workers should at least receive an equitable amount of
compensation, adjusting for the severity of the HIV virus.
Implementation of these measures will help ensure that the interests
of workers with occupationally transmitted HIV are protected and
advanced.
C. Employer Response to Recent Judicial and Legislative Activities
Employers are significantly affected by occurrences of
occupational illness in the workplace. Occupational exposure can lead
to significant workers' compensation liability8 0 and, on the rare
occasion, liability for intentional torts. Moreover, if employer
noncompliance with health and safety standards actually caused the
injury, the employer could face OSHA penalties. Knowledge of
workplace hazards could also influence bargaining power when hiring
new employees. Thus, employers must take affirmative steps to keep
abreast of new occupational hazard standards and changing
legislation.
Employers and injured employees should closely examine the
causation standard utilized for awarding occupational disease claims
in the state. The Doe v. Department of Corrections'81 increased risk
test could serve as a model for predicting the employment standards
that future courts will apply. An employer could use the "increased
risk" test to evaluate which employees are at greater risk for
contracting occupational diseases based on their work-related duties.
Employers could then take extra precautions to protect these workers
from exposure to disease. 182 The employer could also emphasize the
importance of filling out an injury report after each exposure to a
potentially hazardous substance or infected person. These measures
would both augment current safety standards and potentially prevent
future workers' compensation liability.
179. See Gabel, supra note 18, at 407 (discussing compensation that injured workers receive).
180. However, most employers are not held liable for occupational illness coverage under
workers' compensation. See supra Part III.A (discussing the limitations on occupational disease
coverage and compensation).
181. Estate of Doe v. Dep't of Corr., 848 A.2d 378, 384 (2004).
182. The cost of the precaution must be balanced against its potential social value to
determine whether it is worth implementing. See supra Part III.A (discussing the limitations on
occupational disease coverage and compensation).
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Employees and employers should also become familiar with
state statute of limitations restrictions on occupational disease claims.
Moreover, the employer must be aware of state statutory provisions
that presumptively grant occupational disease coverage for HIV
transmissions that occur in certain employment settings. If this type
of statute exists in the employer's state, and the employer does not fall
within one of the designated occupations, it will generally not be liable
under the workers' compensation statutes for employees with
occupationally transmitted HIV. Employers and employees should
also be aware of whether a state statute requires HIV testing after
each exposure to potentially hazardous materials in the workplace and
subsequent testing after the incubation period of the disease has
lapsed. 183 Even in states without mandatory HIV testing, employers
might encourage their workers to voluntarily undergo a series of HIV
tests after exposure to hazardous materials to simplify future
causation concerns.
As discussed above, there are a variety of options available to
remedy or modify the present deficiency of occupational disease
coverage for HIV-infected workers. Most importantly, employers can
avoid occupational disease claims altogether by providing safe work
environments and becoming familiar with state occupational disease
standards.
V. CONCLUSION
Occupationally transmitted HIV outside the health care
industry is a surfacing problem that presents new challenges in
determining the scope of occupational disease coverage under state
workers' compensation schemes. Although several court decisions
addressing this problem have granted coverage by narrowly
interpreting the definition of "occupational disease," the scope of
workers' compensation benefits should be broadened to handle the
burden of additional incidents of infectious diseases.
The Estate of Doe v. Department of Corrections decision
provides insight into the future of occupationally-transmitted AIDS
claims and may offer a viable framework for evaluating these claims.
However, the Doe decision also has a long way to go. Courts should
strive to formulate a clearer occupational disease standard that can be
employed even-handedly to every case. Moreover, additional non-
183. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 617.481 (2006) (requiring an AIDS test with a negative result
within 72 hours after the time of initial exposure, and a follow-up test after the incubation period
of the disease has lapsed, but not later than 12 months after the date of exposure, that reads
positive for the disease).
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judicial methods must be utilized to assure that workers have
comprehensive and adequate coverage. Authoritative action must be
taken from within the workers' compensation system to ensure that
AIDS-infected employees have sufficient coverage.
The findings of this Note extend not only to occupationally
transmitted HIV cases, but also to other infectious diseases, such as
hepatitis and tuberculosis. There are many employees with
occupational diseases who are not receiving adequate workers'
compensation coverage under existing state laws. Consequently, it is
imperative that employers, state legislatures, state and federal
agencies, and courts come together to shape and develop effective
occupational disease policies and standards in order to provide
reasonable compensation to those who suffer from a severe lack of
coverage.
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